Editor’s Note: What follows is part of a cross-blog survey that explores what Central Eurasia might look like fifteen years from now.

Cross-posted at Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In 2021 the oil will be flowing and Azerbaijan and Georgia will benefit. Georgia will continue to elect democratic leaders and Azerbaijan will continue to have corrupt leaders, supported by the U.S. government, who keep the oil pumping and aren’t wise enough to negotiate the terms of the agreements so that the money from the oil will benefit the population. The elite in Azerbaijan are richer and the army is bigger, but the average citizen hasn’t seen a lot of benefits from the oil. Meanwhile, in Armenia, an opening of the Turkish border is a gateway to the E.U. The border has opened in part because of European pressure on Turkey to get along better with its neighbor. The Armenian Genocide, while still not recognized by the Turkish government, is discussed in intellectual circles more and more. The Armenian leadership has not changed much, and like Azerbaijan, leaders base their legitimacy on the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although the Kosovo earned sovereignty process has given the Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership a model to follow to allow Nagorno-Karabakh to exist as an independent state, the leadership has continued to not utilize this solution. In Georgia, the Kosovo earned sovereignty process will give greater hope to the breakaway regions and will create a situation in which political maneuvering will prolong Georgia’s troubles.

But first, it must be taken into consideration that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are small and their success or its failure depends greatly on their more powerful neighbors.

Some major regional issues upon which Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia’s futures depends (in no particular order):

- U.S.A. vs. Iran

o Armenia is greatly dependent on the United States for foreign aid. In 2006 this amount was $76.5 billion. This amount has decreased over the past years, due in part to U.S. government interest in Central Asia from the War on Terror.

o Armenia is also dependent upon Iran. Iran will supply gas to Armenia beginning in 2007.

o Ethnic Azerbaijanis in Northern Iran (Southern Azerbaijan) have been actively protesting this year [source] and some have even been arrested for peaceful protests. [source] This has been a growing issue for the past few years. [source] Azerbaijanis consist of possibly 24% of Iran’s population.

- E.U. and Turkey

o The E.U. and Turkey in 2021 will be entering its first year of work-force movement if Turkey enters the E.U. in 2014. One can only imagine what that will look like! [source]

- E.U. and NATO and South Caucasus

o The E.U. is focusing on Central Asia in 2007. [source] Will the Caucasus come around again after the 2005 European Neighbourhood Policy country reviews?

o The E.U. adopted an Armenian Action plan for the European Neighbourhood Policy. This is “one of the few recent topics that has met with apparent satisfaction from both the government and the opposition.” [source]

o Azerbaijan is the E.U.’s largest trading partner in the region. [source]

o Georgia is intensifying its discussions with NATO. [source] and [source]

- Georgia vs. Russia

o Although Putin has stated that there is no conflict between Russia and Georgia, [source] we know differently.

But the most important issue in the region is the UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS

- Georgia’s breakaway regions

o Saakashvili believes that he can bring together the breakaway regions of Georgia. [source]

- Nagorno-Karabakh

o In January there will be another meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. [source]

A lot of what will happen in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh depends on the outcome of Kosovo’s independence. [more on Kosovo state status process] Kosovo’s “earned” sovereignty is the process of allowing an entity to prove that it is worthy of statehood. The following is excerpted from a study that I did of the earned sovereignty process with Nagorno-Karabakh.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE EARNED SOVEREIGNTY RESOLUTION

One of the most common situations is when a people claim the right to self-determination, the larger entity of which it is a part argues for state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Recently a new idea has emerged to deal with such situations. Earned sovereignty is designed to create an opportunity for resolving such conflicts through managed devolution of sovereign authority and functions from a state to a substate entity and thereby promotes coexistence between a state and a people by establishing a power sharing agreement. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 354-355) Proponents of earned sovereignty say that it is neutral in the debate between self-determination and sovereignty (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355) and that earned sovereignty bridges the “sovereignty first” and “self-determination first” approaches and draw on their strengths while minimizing their disadvantages. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 385) As the sovereignty and self-determination arguments, according to proponents of earned sovereignty state, “have been reduced to little more than legal and political shields behind which states and substate entities justify their actions,”( P. Williams, J. Hooper and M. Scharf, Resolving Sovereignty Based Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned Sovereignty 31 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy (2003). p. 349) finding a new way to determine the future status of a state had to emerge to resolve conflicts. The peoples or substate entities are guided through a process of transition to statehood or heightened autonomy in a way that does not undermine the legitimate interest of parent states and of the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 350-351) Proponents of this strategy also state that earned sovereignty re-establishes security and promotes democracy and institution building. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355)

Sovereignty as a term has a “long and troubled history.” (J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979). p. 26) In its common usage, sovereignty means “totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law” as residing in an independent territorial unit: the state. (J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979). p. 26) Those states, entities, and individuals who generally believe sovereignty is more important than self-determination in determining a people’s status generally want to preserve their territorial integrity. They believe that the state has exclusive jurisdiction to exercise political power and authority within borders and has the right to exercise anything necessary to preserve its territorial integrity from threats. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 352) The international community often opts for sovereignty over self-determination as well. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 353) Those supporting sovereignty over self-determination often perceive earned sovereignty as “potential destabilizing to the current international order by promoting the separation of substate entities from their parent states.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 350-351)

Those states, entities, and individuals preferring self-determination are often secessionist movements and small states without significant minority populations. They believe that all self-identified groups with a coherent identity and connection to a defined territory are entitled to collectively determine their political destiny in a democratic way and should be free from persecution. Self-government is often realized through the creation of an autonomous province within the parent state and sometimes secession. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 353) They often perceive earned sovereignty as “a means for raising the bar for independence.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 351)

Proponents of earned sovereignty claim that these two positions can both be appeased by earned sovereignty because it is “an inherently flexible process implemented over a variable time period.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355) Earned sovereignty encourages a new view of sovereignty existing as a spectrum. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 374)

Earned sovereignty is defined by three core elements: one, shared sovereignty in which the state, or an international organization, and the substate entity both exercise some sovereign authority over a territory for a specified period of time (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355); two, institution building in which the substate entity undertakes to construct new institutions for self-government (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355), and three, determination of final status, in which the relationship between the state and the substate entity is determined with the consent of the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355)

Earned sovereignty may also have three optional elements to increase the flexibility of the plan: one, phased sovereignty in which the substate entity gets increasing sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of time before the determination of final status (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356); two, conditional sovereignty in which the substate entity is required to meet certain benchmarks before it can acquire increased sovereignty (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356); and three, constrained sovereignty where there are continued limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356)

When the time comes to determine the final status of the substate entity, any type of internal or external self-determination could happen from substantial autonomy to full independence. This decision is often made through either some sort of referendum or in negotiations and usually involves the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 365)

Many conflicts that involve the self-determination versus sovereignty debate have utilized earned sovereignty: East Timor (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356), Serbia and Montenegro (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 357), Northern Ireland (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 357), Bougainville and Papua New Guinea (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Bosnia (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Kosovo (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Sudan (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 359), Israel and Palestine (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 359), and Western Sahara (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 360). There are many more self-determination versus sovereignty conflicts that are still unresolved; could earned sovereignty work in these cases as well?

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY SOLUTION

As Nagorno-Karabakh is a classic self-determination versus sovereignty issue, could earned sovereignty be the best route for this region? By examining what all three sides as well as other interested parties have stated as their desires, an earned sovereignty plan could emerge According to the International Crisis Group; the Armenian negotiators want to call for a settlement which would make explicit that status remains an open question. (Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace International Crisis Group Europe Report 167 11 October 2005. p. 12) This implies that the Armenian side is considering earned sovereignty as a possibility.

A group of international lawyers designed an earned sovereignty plan for the region and believe that their proposal is “designed to produce a phased resolution of the crisis with clear benchmarks for measuring compliance by the parties. If adopted and then implemented improperly, the proposal should lead to a final settle that promotes peaceful relations between Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, and Armenia.” (A Blueprint for Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis, New England Center for International Law and Policy June 2000. p. 2) Peace talks in France during the second week of February 2005 in which earned sovereignty was proposed failed to bring any result.

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT POSSIBLE

The failure is not with the earned sovereignty plan; rather it is the political concerns of the parties. As Williams and Pecci state, “given that the use of the earned sovereignty approach generally requires the consent of the state and substate entities that are party to a conflict, the precise dimensions of the approach as applied to a particular conflict are shaped by the political concerns of each party involved.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 351) The political concerns of leaders in unstable, nationalistic and corrupt states with opposition parties waiting in the lurches, biased media, multinational corporations (especially oil and gas companies), as well as a citizenry that must deal with military drafts, widows, orphans and refugees are perhaps too great at this time for an earned sovereignty plan to work. The leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan depends on the conflict for legitimacy. In Azerbaijan, the current leadership “owes its rise to power to skilful manipulation of popular protest over the handling of the Karabakh issue, and to loud pledges to resolve the conflict quickly and without losses to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan. A retreat from this position now would be dangerous and potentially threatening to government’s legitimacy.” (R. Musabayov, “The Karabakh conflict and democratization in Azerbaijan” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) In Armenia “the dominating principle of the incumbent Armenian authorities’ foreign policy is to maintain, as long as possible, the current situation over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and preserve the fragile balance of forces in the South Caucasian region.” (D. Shahnazaryan, “New Challenges and Conflicts in South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as the Key Regional Conflict” Report from Armenia/the South Caucasus and Foreign Policy Challenges Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor October 2004.)

Are these types of states and leaders in a position to resolve conflicts within its borders and “offer the necessary guarantees of rights to its former autonomous regions? (H. Tchilingirian, “New structures, old foundations: state capacities for peace” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) The likely answer is no. Former OSCE Minsk Group co-chair Carey Cavanaugh stated after the failure of peace talks in 2001 that the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, “were ahead of their people,” (S. Freizer, “A last chance for peace?” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) but a more likely explanation is that what the leadership says in privately during negotiations and what they say during public political rallies is extremely different. Post-Soviet elitism, secretiveness and centralization create a situation that allows the leadership to control the peace process and perhaps more importantly, information about its contents. “Autonomous civic initiatives to broaden debate on the conflict ­ and specifically what can legitimately be said about it in public ­ are regarded with suspicion, or worse, confronted with charges of ‘capitulation’.” (L. Broers in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) Until the leaderships can stop thinking about their own power and begin thinking about what is best for their people, an earned sovereignty approach cannot resolve the battle between the shields of self-determination and sovereignty that these leaders use to mask their true intentions. The political behaviour behind the masks is too deep and profitable for those involved in negotiations and therefore earned sovereignty, which could be a feasible solution, is not a current possibility for resolution.

Comments hosted at the Armenia Neweurasia site.paparazzi nude pics
horny blonde teens
exotic filipina gro manila cebu hotels
extreme camel toe
filipina asian
banging in public
enema lovers forum
old man neil young
kenmarcus password
bubble butt brazilian orgy
dirty old man
panty hose pics
Dana DeArmond Does The Internet
bi male images
sexing chicks
teens first orgasm
sex machine plans
paris hilton free sex
hustler couples
ethnic ffm
where to buy nylon tea bags
birthday party for ninety years old
vin diesel naked
india summer milf
hard clit
Milf Filth CD-2
sapphic erotica wmv rapidshare
tranny many
beijing blog
fantasy erotic stories
bbw phone sex
brunette squirter
grannys gushing cum
hot sexy moms
gothic vampire myspace layouts
extreme tattoo
hairy strip
brazil referee playboy
old guy ffm
girls masturbating in the shower
beast slut
xxx stories free
celebrity chick ludacris
public whore
filipina sexy tgp
nifty erotic stories archives
skinny black girls
extreme holly pissing
dirty comic strips
public male nudity
celebs upskirt
girls in bikini pics
kylie wilde squirting
pure handjob
just like facial flex
cheerleader porn lesbian
sylvia and peirce ferriter
cum kiss
anal bestiality
hidden up skirt pics
blonde shaved pussy
large pussy lips free
Scandinavian Fuckfest Onanishow
cfnm january
springs creative products group
rich little bitch lindsey meadows dvd previews
voyeur cameltoe
bikini sexy
celebrity sluts
young sexy teens
gay hardcore office sex
mature wifes
giant women swallow guys whole
adult halloween party ideas
apartamentos en granada
sexcam gratis
fresh shaved
msn photo swap messenger problem
party boy theme song mp3
naked redhead mature
bi sexual xxx
animal fetishes
anal women
free pics of nude muscle studs
tight pussys
gymnastic camel toe
laser tattoo removal michigan
free male celebrity sex tapes
bondage tranny
young sluts with glasses
petite blowjob
Triple Stacked-13 CD-1
mature women having sex
animal pendants
boss fuck
little kid porn
hairy gay ass
free olsen twins fake porn
japanese secretary orgasm
young bisexual porn
beach themed bridal shower
gushing orgasms
newport beach breast reconstruction
teen in tights
hard money loan personal unsecured california ca
Private Xtreme-32 DP Factory
gay military sexx
teen topanga username and password
big titted midgets
shower boobs
naked skinny
women in crotchless panties
american bad ass
thong skirt
sexy costumes and french maid
korean bbq spare ribs ‘recipie’
brunette outdoors solo
public orgies
gang fuck
mom loves pussy
busty chubby girls
lesbian sex slaves
sylvia spokane
crossdressers orgy
sex strangulation clips
lesbian strapon orgasm
face fuck gag
big tits public sex
paris hilton nude boobs
wife’s tits cum
thumbnail bukkake cumshots
sadie belle behind gags
freckled boobs
jerking ffm
erotic nude girls
cam chat adult face to face
animated bdsm gifs
latex masks halloween
fist logo
sexy blonde fuck
paparazzi websites
abduction and rape stories
archos 504 personal media player
silvia tug job
blowjobs in public free
small dog carrier
lesbian strapon bdsm
free midget porn
straight stud cumming
drunk driving photos
redhead young
caught fucking my sister
sexy latinos
tranny masturbate
kalamazoo college
cfnm mpeg
hp psc 2175xi driver download
confidential college coeds
ballhoneys please fuck my roommate wmv
free filipina video porn

By Vasili Rukhadze

What follows is one part of a cross-blog initiative that commemorates the 1991 Moscow coup and evaluates the years in between.

In the history of mankind there have been few events approaching the magnitude of the break up of the Soviet Union in December of 1991. It was a “geopolitical earthquake” that fundamentally reshaped the entire political landscape, spinning the globe on five continents and leaving fifteen independent nations on the place of one single state.

The events of recent history need to be seen through the filter of passing time in order to appreciate their real value and the developments that flow from them. So indeed do the events of the past fifteen years in the newly-independent former Soviet republics. But there are many things still that already can be clearly seen, named and weighed on the accurate scale of history.

Among the former Soviet republics, Georgia has been most heavily pounded by destructive forces unleashed since the dissolution of the union. The nation experienced two bloody ethnic-separatist wars, a military coup followed by a civil war lasting two years, the foray of warlords, private armies, the rule of the most notoriously corrupt regime, a deep economic crisis and the peaceful “Rose Revolution” in 2003, which ended the twelve year long devastation of the country.

On the eve of the Soviet collapse expectations for national independence and a better life were very high in Georgian society. In fact, they were so high that they swept anti-Soviet nationalist forces under the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia into power with 87% of the vote in the country’s first-ever free elections, held in 1990. Gamsakhurdia became Georgia’s first president. He pushed hard to build an independent state, free of post-Soviet legacy and Russian dominance. However, he lacked the talent for political manipulations so desperately needed in the merciless jungle of post-Soviet politics. Gamsaskhurdia quickly became isolated both domestically and internationally and this political idealist found himself alone against a coalition of post-communist and pro-Russian Georgian elite (later labeled the “Red Intelligentsia” by Georgian intellectuals), an armed radical opposition, a renegade military and the “Eduard Shevardnadze machine.”

Eduard Shevardnadze, an ethnic Georgian and the former foreign minister of the Soviet Union, was living in Moscow when the union collapsed. Relying on his international image as a democrat, as well as his influence and wealth, he obtained international support and cover-up of the “democratic revolution” of the violent military coup that overthrew president Gamsakhurdia in January of 1992, at which time Gamsakhurdia fled the country. He returned in 1993 and later died under vague circumstances (his staunch followers declare he was killed by Shevardnadze’s police and the Russian Secret Service) at the end of the Georgian civil war.

Shevardnadze returned to Georgia in 1992 as Head of State. His return marked the beginning of a two-year-long (1992-1993) bloody civil war between his and Gamsakhurdia’s forces, economic impoverishment, rule of warlords and armed gangs and humiliating defeats in the Russian-supported ethnic-separatist wars in South Ossetia (begun during Gamsakhurdia’s rule in 1990 and continued to 1992) and in Abkhazia (in 1993), killing some 30,000 Georgians and displacing another 350,000 in both provinces. The wars were followed by yet another humiliating step in which Shevardnadze forced Georgia into the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a sign of Georgian capitulation after defeats in the Russian-sponsored separatist wars.
(more…)

By Vasili Rukhadze

The recent “Kodori Valley” crisis in Georgia ended very quickly. Apparently, it did not turn out to be as dramatic and lengthy as its organizers, ousted warlord Emzar Kvitsiani and his allies, had hoped.

In a swift two day-long police operation, the 400-men strong rebel force was arrested or surrendered to Georgian police and military forces, others dispersed or fled from the gorge (supposedly to Abkhaz-separatist-controlled territory) as their leader Emzar Kvitisiani has done. After thirteen years of lawlessness, gang violence and instability, finally the Georgian central government regained its control over the north-western part (upper Kodori Valley) of separatist Abkhazia. It is in fact the only portion of the region that remained outside of separatist control after the end of Georgian-Abkhaz war in 1992-1993.

The “Kvitisiani factor” has been developing for quite a long time. Emzar Kvitisiani was born in the Kodori Valley of Georgia’s Abkhazian Autonomous Republic in 1963, as an ethnic Georgian by birth. In his life he has been convicted and imprisoned twice: the first time for robbery and the second time for hooliganism. After the Georgian defeat in the Abkhaz war in 1993, Kvitisiani became the leader of one of the unofficial guerrilla-militia groups. These groups sprang up on the edges of the territory controlled by Abkhaz separatists, with the intention to resist Abkhaz military gangs and defend Georgian population. Kvitsiani’s group was named as “Monadire” (Hunter) and operated from the upper Kodori Valley. In fact, the Kodori Valley became the only part of Abkhazia that Georgian forces managed to retain under control thanks to the impassable high terrain and forests (only later to let it fall to warlords).
(more…)

Everything new, previously unknown for the society usually gives rise to dual reactions in different masses of people; all the major innovations are eventually followed by lots of challenges but, in my opinion, there are truly worth it!

The Rose Revolution of 2003, which was the logical ending of great political and social unrest in Georgia, brought many changes in almost every aspect of life. New leaders took field against corruption with great passion and encouraged Georgian citizens to put effort in building new democratic state where the violation of human rights and classification of groups according to their religious beliefs would not be acceptable.

New ministries developed equal opportunities and the hope appeared from the mist of old political order where social, political ranks and even simple factory jobs were given through bribery, where a “Grandfather Clause” was the basic fear of starting a successful career. Now, at the dawn of establishing real democracy which requires compromises from our government and participation from us as well as creating a system of checks and balances”, major reforms took place in the field of education.

A new system of college exams has been introduced. Education is the basic concern for our new President because the situation in universities was tragic before. Students paid bribes to get in college. The ones who had knowledge but no financial sources or enough honesty were left out. Some young people disappointed with the unfairness of those exams used to start smoking, drinking and doing drugs! Universities, on the other hand, produced unskilled teachers, lawyers, and doctors whose weak professionalism turned out to be fatal for some patients.

For this reason the goal of the new exams is to eliminate in college the number of students who have minimal sense of reasoning and no capacity of learning new materials. Tests are made to examine each person’s ability of analyzing facts, not the ability to memorize as much as possible! Those exams are very fair as well because people who correct the tests are only aware of the passwords not the names. Other information is saved in computers confidentially.

Students can indicate their favorite future profession on a special exam card; they have seven choices of faculties and universities that make it extremely flexible and give students more chances to get in college.

I am really proud of people who work productively to prepare those tests and operate the exams itself. They try to make our diplomas valuable in the rest of the world.

Although, there are lots of individuals who are very skeptical towards this new system and make demonstrations against it almost every week. Some university professors are outraged because the new minister of education, Kakhsber Lomaia, cut all the illegal sources for them to make extra money from tutoring and other bribing activities.

Regardless all these anti-patriots and self-centered part of our society our education is moving forward!

The future begins today!

Ana is a 17-year old Georgian student who has a variety of interests, but is especially interested in the arts. She participated in the Young Caucasus Women blog project earlier this year.

Cross-posted on the homebase.

After the November 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, many predicted that the young and inexperienced administration of Georgian president Saakashvili would collapse without actually changing anything in Georgia. However, President Saakashvili’s reforms turned out to be successful and appear to be working well. His overwhelming zeal and passion is felt in every reform and action taken for the strengthening of the Georgian state. But what are those reforms that Mr. Saakashvili did after all, within two and half years of his rule, that obviously started to reshape Georgia, lift it from the hopelessness, lawlessness and corruption and gradually turn it to a modest nation?

Saakashvili is merciless when it comes to ruin the old and rotten - obstacles to his reforms. He, with a strong hand, cut and reduced the corrupt and unprofessional Georgian Police of 30,000 men to half of that, simply firing thousands of policemen (along with traffic police). They used to spread on the highways and streets of Georgian cities, extorting huge bribes for both minor traffic violations or serious crimes. Fired policemen took to the streets to protest against “unlawful” layoff, but Saakashvili simply went on to start the creation of new Police Patrol in a calm and swift manner. Thousands of young Georgian citizens were called to participate in examinations set to determine physically and intellectually most fit to join the force. Thousands of new policemen were enrolled in new Police Patrol, based only on their professionalism and honesty. Their monthly salaries were increased tenfold reaching 700 Georgian Lari, pretty much enough for a medium size Georgian family to live decently from month to month. Well dressed and well armed, Georgian police soon became main force in the government’s fight against corruption and gained respect within Georgian society. The level of trust towards Georgian Police currently reaches 75%, which is highest not only in the former Soviet Union, but also in entire Eastern Europe.

Mr. Saakashvili mercilessly attacked corrupt state officials. He arrested dozens of officials, who served under ex-president Shevardnadze’s administration and stole millions of dollars from the state coffins. With rare exceptions, based on the newly adopted law, these arrested officials were set free in return for bringing tens of millions of stolen dollars back to the government. Ironically, this sum substantially increased the state budget within a time period of only six months. Mr.Saakashvili additionally created the Financial Police, as a watchdog, which along with Georgian Interior Ministry, permanently searches, detects and eradicates any traces of corruption. Since Saakashvili came to power hundreds of judges, managers, policemen, businessmen and state bureaucrats (including Saakashvili’s ruling National Party members) were arrested on corruption, tax evasion and tax fraud charges.

Saakashvili made a mortal blow to the Georgian mafia. Dozens of “Thieves in Law” (Mafia Dons) were arrested. Dozens of others fled from Georgia to Russia or other Eastern European countries. Their properties have been confiscated by the Georgian government. Many Georgian mafia members, convicted for different crimes, were arrested and extradited to Georgia from former Soviet republics. Georgian mafia, so powerful during Soviet times and under Shevardnade’s regime entirely lost its control and influence not only on Georgian state structures, but on the Georgian business as well, thus giving a huge boost to Georgian economy. Saakashvili entirely changed the Georgian prison system putting “Thieves in Law” and ordinary convicts in the same prison buildings and cells, this way further diminishing their influence in jails and stripping them off all the privileges and comforts that “thieves” enjoyed and nurtured in their isolated and lavish cells.

Saakashvili also attacked the corrupt Georgian educational system. All the presidents of state universities, heads of the faculties and many professors of state universities got fired, some of them were arrested on corruption charges. In one blow Saakashvili denied the old caste of “Red Professors” their cushy positions which they firmly occupied since Soviet times, uninterrupted during Shevardnadze’s rule. This caste turned state universities and educational institutions into money making machines where all prestigious positions and places at departments were sold to students in high prices. This deep corruption diminished the overall quality and level of Georgian science, medicine, art, cinema and sport. Saakashvili reduced the number of private and state universities, merging them and leaving only highly qualified institutions to survive. The number of departments, as well as of professorial positions was drastically reduced. New, young and honest rectors, departmental chairs and professors were appointed, brought in through difficult tests and competitive examinations. Saakashvili’s new education reform aims at eradication of corruption in the system and bringing it up to international standards. One main step towards this was the establishment of one, united National Examination (American GRE and GMAT-like) for all Georgian high school graduates, willing to continue their studies for a degree at higher institutions. The examination is tightly controlled and honestly determines the intellectual level of the applicant. Applicants are also given advice and offers for higher educational institutions based on their test result. This test greatly diminishes the decision-making power of the professor on the exam and represents a lethal blow against corruption at Georgian educational system.

Saakashvili established Professional Competitive Examination, for all the willing to fill executive and judicial positions in Georgian regions. Many newcomers, who were not even members of the ruling National Movement party (or any other political party) won the competition and were appointed as judges and state executives in many districts. While state bureaucrats and judges are being closely watched for any possible misconduct, their salaries were increased.

Reforms continue at Customs Department of Georgia, notorious for its level of corruption under ex-President Shevardnadze’s regime. Hundreds of officials were fired or arrested on corruption charges. The size of the department was reduced and new professional examination brought many young and honest professionals.

Reforms continue, as continues the fight between old and new Georgia: The old with its nepotistic and corrupt culture and the new with its reformist spirit. Not everything is sunny and rosy in Georgia right now. Many things were done but much more needs to be done. The president’s overwhelming popularity is also diminished because of painful and not always popular reforms. But as President Saakashvili once put it himself, reformist presidents’ fate is always the same - their popularity decreases until they eventually get voted out. What endures are their reforms, giving new breath to new nations, raising them from the mud and backwardness of the past.

Georgia’s path on reforms continues, thus offering very interesting case of study for the students of political science, history and all others interested in political development of post-Soviet states.

Vasili Rukhadze holds an M.A. in Political Science from The City University of New York.

Civil Georgia reports that four leading opposition parties – the New Rights, Labor, Conservative and Republican - announced on March 3 that they will consolidate their efforts to confront the government’s policies on various issues.

Leaders of these four opposition parties met in the office of the Labor Party on March 3, to discuss plans for cooperation in preparation for local self-governance elections scheduled for this autumn.

The parties identified two focus issues for their agenda: government-imposed new regulations for outdoor market vendors and a scandal involving the links of top officials from the Interior Ministry to the Sandro Girgvliani murder case.

During a March 4th meeting with Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said that he hopes the Georgian government will take a balanced approach to the resolution adopted by Georgia’s parliament, which called for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the conflict zones. Annan sounded cautiously optimistic that the U.N. Security Council will unanimously vote to extend the UNOMIG mandate, which expires at the end of March.

ITAR-TASS

ITAR-TASS reports that the Russian government will hold a meeting Thursday, in which it will consider a bilateral agreement with Georgia on the provisional terms of deployment of Russian military bases in that country.

The agreement will reportedly set up a joint working group between the two sides to determine the size and patterns of compensation for reciprocal damage.

On the whole, the agreement sets up legal format for solving the problems that arise from the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia.

On Thursday, Dr. Christopher Waters of the University of Reading and Mr Scott Newton of SOAS met in London to discuss Georgia’s Rose Revolution from a legal and institutional perspective. The title: “Revolution through Rose-coloured Glasses: Law and Institutions in Georgia” should set the stage for a critical reflection on Georgia’s pre- and post-revolutionary performance in legal reform, and whether the events in 2003 really marked a real watershed in Georgian history.

Dr. Waters was the first to speak and he addressed three myths about law in the South Caucasus in general, and in Georgia in particular. What follows is an unofficial transcript of his talk. Please do not reprint this transcript without permission.

Myth One: Lawlessness in the South Caucasus

This prejudice has historical roots: Russian expansion towards the Caucasus was always transfigured as a civilised army fighting against clans in the rigged mountain ranges of the Caucasus. It is a stereotype that continues until today and is echoed by many visitors to the Georgian countryside (e.g. Svaneti).

There are many historical examples of Georgian lawmaking, including the 18th century code of Georgian King Vakhtang VI. The Tsarist and Soviet periods have both seen the implementation of relatively complex legal systems in Georgia’s territory and legal scholarship reached decent levels in the late Soviet period. Today, improvements in the legal system are visible if one considers the ten-year period 1996-2006. The rule of law is strengthened; people working in the field are more competent and less corrupt.

Myth Two: The pivotal/tipping point in the amelioration of the legal system came with the Rose Revolution

The common perception holds that under Shevardnadze, the legal system stagnated and was heavily corrupt and that after the Rose Revolution, this changed significantly.

However, legal reforms under Shevardnadze were actually significant: The 1995 constitution (that does hold up to ‘Western’ standards) is still – with variations - in place today. Other milestones in the legal development of the country included the 1996 Constitutional Court, the 1997 new Civil Code and the 1998 Criminal Code. Significant impetus for change also came with the 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, an agreement that harmonised certain Georgian legislation with European law. The accession of Georgia to the Council of Europe in 1999 introduced the European Convention of Human Rights.

The 1997 judiciary reforms demonstrate how far-reaching the changes were in practice: Georgia adopted one general system of jurisdiction, ended the authority of the Ministry of Justice (a heritage from Soviet days), and installed a quasi-independent council to oversea the courts. What one could witness were quite systematic, far-reaching reforms albeit flaws did of course exist. Incidentally, the architect of these changes was no-one less than Mikhail Saakashvili, who was to become Georgia’s new president after the 2003 Rose Revolution.

Myth Three: Was the Rose Revolution the ‘Great Leap Forward’?

Many good things have happened since Saakashvili took over power. For example, rampant corruption within the traffic police has been reduced. Business legislation has also visibly improved.

However, this can mostly be described as continuity vis-à-vis the previous administration’s score-card on legal and institutional reform. Major problems today include:

In 2005, five Supreme Court judges resigned, probably because of bullying. While this is an alarming sign, it could also resemble a drive to get rid of ‘incompetent’ judges.

Torture is still a huge problem in the Georgian legal system. A confession is still treated as the ‘queen of all evidence’ (another Soviet heritage). According to the ombudsperson, there were at least 1,100 cases of torture recorded after the Rose Revolution until 2004. Nonetheless, progress is being made: Georgia signed the European Convention against Torture and has promised to deliver measurable progress.

Was corruption effectively tackled since the Rose Revolution? Again, progress is being made, illustrated by the conviction of Shevardnadze’s son-in-law. Apparently, however, plea bargains are the strategy the Georgian government choses, i.e. the perpetrator has to return all money illegally earned in order to avoid persecution. Taking into account the cash-starved Georgian economy, this is understandable and even commendable. However, the cash trail of these recovered funds is diffuse at best. There is no institutional accountability inbuilt within the current political system. Coupled with increasing restrictions being put on independent media and a hasty pushing-through of constitutional amendments, it becomes ever more obvious that Georgia has not reached a turning point with the Rose Revolution. Rather, there is a lot of continuity with respect to the pre-revolution days.

Concluding Remarks

It might not be fair to judge Georgia against Western standards of legal systems: It is more appropriate to compare Georgia’s performance with those of other post-Soviet countries of the region. In this light, Georgia scores well on almost all accounts. With regards to the legal systems of Azerbaijan and Armenia for example, Georgia is far ahead. But the country had begun its progressive reforms under Shevardnadze, despite all his faults as a leader.

According to UNESCO, Georgia is classified as “low level” HIV/AIDS epidemic country. The main means of HIV transmission in Georgia is through interveinous drug use. Though HIV infection rates are on the rise, the United National AIDS programme and Georgia’s own program have taken many steps to reduce HIV infection:

Under the global fund project, the government has already achieved remarkable progress: a legislative framework for harm-reduction programmes is in place, HIV/AIDS information, education, voluntary counselling and testing services for youth and high risk groups have been expanded, nation-wide scale-up of prevention of mother-to-child transmission and 100 per cent accessibility to care and treatment have been ensured. (see UNICEF in Action)

Recently, journalists in Georgia met to discuss the challanges of HIV/AIDS education and prevention as part of the World Vision’s Safe!-2 program. World Vision along with Georgian NGO Tanadgoma (the georgian word for support) held a two day seminar for Jounralists in the southern region of Samtskhe Javakheti discussing the role of media in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Currently, there are approximately 3000 reported cases of HIV in Georgia, and a reported death rate of less than 200 per year. Approximately 70% of the reported cases are due to IV drug use.

Georgia’s health care system is still heavily dependent on foreign aid, and years of underfunding and corruption have taken there toll. Georgia faces constant shortages in material and pharmaceuticals and physician training is substandard. However, the government has taken stepd to reduce the impact of HIV and AIDS. Georgia was one of the first former Soviet Republics to develop a national programme in 1994 followed by a strategic action plan for 2003-2007. The action plan has seven priority areas:

Georgia is a recipient of Global Fund grants from UNAIDS. Georgia’s proposal was approved in February 2003, and it will be receive US$ 12.1m over five years.

HIV and AIDS activities in Georgia are coordinated by the “Governmental Commission on HIV/AIDS, STIs and other Socially Dangerous Infections”. This commission, created in 1996, is now functioning as the Country Coordinating Mechanism with government, civil society and UN participation.

Other Links:

UNAIDS: Georgia Country Profile
CIA World Fact File: Georgia

Both Joel and Jeremy contributed to this post